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Accounting for Imputed and Capital Income Flows in 
Income Inequality Analyses 
 
Using representative and consistent microdata from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
Study (SOEP) from 1985-2007, we illustrate that capital income (CI = return on financial 
investments) and imputed rent (IR = return on investments in owner-occupied housing) have 
become increasingly important sources of economic inequality in Germany over the last two 
decades. Whereas the operationalization of CI in this paper is based on monetary returns on 
financial investments only, our definition of IR follows a regulation by the European 
Commission, (EC) which is currently being used to harmonize income measurement for the 
European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) in Europe. While both of 
these components represent some kind of return on alternative private investments, our 
results indicate that they do not coincide in their impacts on income inequality and poverty. In 
line with the literature, net IR as defined according to the EC regulation tends to exert a 
dampening effect on inequality and relative poverty, very much driven by the increasing 
share of outright ownership among the elderly. On the other hand, inequality is boosted by CI 
especially when looking at the upper tail of the income distribution. As the German public 
pension scheme gradually loses its ability to maintain people’s living standards into 
retirement, we find these effects to increase over time. The analyses presented here, 
exemplified for Germany, make a clear case for the joint consideration of all components of 
private investment income for the purpose of welfare analysis, be they of a monetary or non-
monetary nature. This appears to be relevant in at least three dimensions of comparative 
research: (1) across time; (2) across space, regions, welfare regimes; (3) across the 
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1  Motivation 
Income inequality has clearly increased in the majority of OECD countries over the 
past 20 years (see OECD 2008). Various factors have contributed to this general trend, such 
as increasing unemployment, growing wage inequality induced by skilled-based technological 
change (see Card and DiNardo 2002) and immigration (for the US, see, e.g., Borjas 2006). 
Recent literature on growing inequality focussing on the upper tail of the distribution (Atkin-
son and Piketty 2007) has shown that, e.g., the superstar phenomenon (i.e., the compensation 
for CEOs) had an independent effect on increased inequality (Bebchuk and Grinstein 2005). 
Above and beyond such processes on the labor market, changing demographic structures also 
exert an independent effect on the income distribution: these include increasing shares of 
single-person households and lone-parent families, and the ageing phenomenon, together with 
selective mortality and lower fertility rates (see Reed 2006 for an analysis of the British case). 
While the impact of increased earnings inequality on overall inequality has been de-
scribed in depth, less is known about the impact of other specific income components, in 
particular investment income. This research gap is considerable, given that returns on invest-
ment and income from self-employment have clearly increased in importance compared to 
labour’s  share  in  domestic  income  in  nearly  all  OECD  countries  over  the  past  20  years 
(OECD 2008). In Germany, this development was clearly in favour of net investment income 
(see Figure 1). While net investment income more than doubled over the period 1991-2007, 
employees’ compensation as well as profits and income from self-employment increased by 
less than 40% only. Existing literature on the increasing importance of investment income (at 
the micro-level) includes Jäntti (1997) for Great Britain and the USA as well as Frässdorf et 
al. (2008) and Becker (2000) for Germany. All of these authors consistently report that the 
impact of property income on overall inequality is about two to three times higher than its 
contribution to overall income. However, all those papers consider only monetary returns on 
investments, thus ignoring (fictitious) income advantages arising from investments in owner-
occupied housing. This appears to be inconsistent with the fact that buying one’s own home is 
just an alternative to reaping benefits from investments in the capital market, i.e., receiving 
interests and dividends. However, there is a separate strand of literature focusing on the im-
pact of non-monetary income components on income inequality, not at least in order to im-
prove cross-national comparability of inequality analyses (see Canberra Group 2001). Im-  4 
puted rent for owner-occupied housing is the most prominent example (see, e.g., Yates 1994 
for Australia, Frick & Grabka 2003 for the USA, UK and Germany)1. Typically the net value 
of imputed rent increases in age due to the nature of the mortgage repayment schemes, thus 
yielding a decrease in income inequality and especially in relative income poverty among the 
elderly, and providing an effective means of old-age provision.  
Figure 1: The development of income aggregates in the German System of National Accounts 
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Compensation of employees Profits / income from self-employment Net investment income
Source: authors’ calculations based on The German Council of Economic Experts (SVR 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, there appears to be no comprehensive analysis to date on the joint im-
pact of monetary and non-monetary returns on capital investments. This lack appears even 
more crucial given that increased income inequality is typically accompanied by increased 
wealth inequality (see Frick and Grabka 2009). Both economic outcome measures interact, 
with high income earners typically having higher saving rates and thus accumulating more 
wealth than low income groups, i.e., wealth and financial wealth in particular can be a distinct 
source of income itself. One might hypothesize that this interaction is of specific relevance in 
                                                                        
1 The EU-funded project “Accurate Income Measurement for the Assessment of Public Policies (AIM-
AP) provides a series of papers on the distributional impact of non-cash incomes from private sources (including 
imputed rent) as well as from public provision of services (in the domains of health, housing and education) for a 
variety of EU countries (see http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/aim-ap-project). All of those empiri-
cal analyses clearly support the claim of considering non-cash incomes in the measurement of economic well-
being.    5 
ageing societies. Although the standard life-cycle theory (Jappelli and Modigliani 2005) pre-
dicts a consumption of capital in old age, (significant) dissaving cannot be observed in many 
countries including Germany, where the median elderly household showed a saving rate of 
above 4% (savings defined as additions to the physical capital stock, see Börsch-Supan et al. 
2003). Thus elderly individuals tend to remain in a preferable wealth position, thus continu-
ously receiving returns on their investments.2 At the same time, elderly homeowners tend to 
profit above average from the consideration of imputed rent.   
The increased importance of investment income can partly be explained by a shift in 
favour of a private coverage of old-age insurance, particularly in non-liberal welfare systems. 
Due to the significant reduction in benefits from the statutory pension insurance, employees 
increasingly need to participate in occupational and private pension schemes. As a conse-
quence of this reorientation of the public old-age insurance system, individuals in general will 
enjoy higher claims from investment income, although most likely in a rather unequal man-
ner. 
The aim of this paper is give a comprehensive view of the joint impact of the two 
components  of  investment  income,  namely  “(monetary)  capital  income  (CI)”  and  “(non-
monetary) imputed rent (IR)”. We make use of more than 20 waves of consistently measured 
income data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP). After describing the microdata 
used and the methods applied to investigate the impact of investment income on overall ine-
quality and poverty in Section 2, Section 3 presents the empirical findings with respect to the 
incidence and relevance, separately, of the two components of investment income, CI and IR. 
We consider these components in our “full” income concept relative to a “baseline” income 
concept net of investment income in order to investigate their respective impacts on inequality 
and poverty. Decomposition by subgroup is used to identify beneficiaries of investment in-
come.. Section 4 concludes.  
                                                                        
2  However, the empirical analyses of the process of “dissaving” should not be evaluated simply on the basis of 
repeated cross-sectional and cohort specific data but rather using panel data in order to effectively control for 
selectivity in mortality (see DeNardi et al. 2009). In other words, comparing wealth endowments across age 
cohorts in a given point in time and inferring from this how well-off the future elderly will be may not ade-
quately reflect the process of individual (dis)saving behaviour.    6 
2  Data and Methods 
2.1  The German Socio-Economic-Panel (SOEP) 
The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) is a representative longitudinal survey of 
individuals living in private households in Germany (Wagner et al. 2007). The survey was 
started in 1984 in West Germany and was extended to East Germany in June 1990, somewhat 
more than half a year after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The initial sample included over 12,000 
respondents, with everyone aged 17 and over in sample households being interviewed. In 
recent  years, new sub-samples have been drawn, which approximately doubled the initial 
sample size. Due to the high concentration of economic resources (income and wealth) at the 
top of the distribution, welfare analyses based on representative population surveys are often 
confronted with the lack of information on rich individuals. In order to overcome this prob-
lem, the SOEP introduced a high income sample in 2002, over-representing the top 3% of the 
income distribution—this sample is thus included in the more recent years of our time series. 
The sample analyzed in Section 3 employs all available observation years up to survey year 
2007.  
One of the main problems when asking for (specific) income and wealth information 
in any population survey is non-response, and SOEP is no exception to this rule. Due to the 
rather irregular and volatile nature of capital income, questions targeted at this income com-
ponent are severely hampered by such measurement problems, clearly imposing a threat to the 
explanatory power and validity of the data. Making effective use of the panel nature of SOEP, 
any item non-response is corrected for by applying longitudinal (and cross-sectional) imputa-
tion techniques, thus at least reducing eventual bias arising from the above-mentioned selec-
tivity (see Frick and Grabka 2005).  
Another problem in the empirical assessment of the impact of capital income on ine-
quality lies in the volatility of this income component (even before the recent financial crisis). 
Single cross-sectional analyses of capital income can suffer from discretionary changes and 
fluctuations in the value of an asset and the implicit returns. Thus it seems crucial to use re-
peated and consistently surveyed information about capital income over a longer period to 
isolate the independent effect of that income component on overall inequality. Again, the time   7 
series information collected in SOEP from the very same households does help to assess the 
quality of the income information, including possible measurement error.  
2.2  Definition of income measures 
2.2.1  Baseline income 
We assess the impact of CI and IR on inequality by comparing results from a more 
comprehensive  (or  “full”)  income  concept,  including  these  two  components,  with  results 
derived from a baseline income excluding any investment income. Our analyses focus on 
economic well-being after redistribution through government and social security schemes, 
thus we apply a measure of equivalent annual post-government income.3 We correct for dif-
ferent income needs of households with different sizes and age compositions by calculating 
equivalent incomes using the modified OECD scale, which assigns a value of 1 to the head of 
household, 0.5 to all adult household members aged 14 and over, and a value of 0.3 to chil-
dren below 14 years of age.  In order to allow for comparability across time, all incomes are 
expressed in euros (introduced only in 2002) and all measures are deflated to 2000 prices 
(including a correction of purchasing power differences between East and West Germany).  
2.2.2  Components of investment income 
In  the  following  section,  we  briefly  describe  the  two  types  of  investment  income 
which are at the heart of the empirical analyses in Section 3, namely capital income (CI) and 
imputed rent (IR).  
2.2.2.1  Capital Income (CI) 
The definition of capital income is anything but clear-cut, and reconciling macro- and 
micro-data requires harmonisation of measurement concepts. In the system of national ac-
counts (SNA), capital income is being used as synonym for investment income and property 
income, and covers income derived from a resident entity's ownership of domestic and foreign 
assets. The most common types of investment income are income on equity (dividends, dis-
                                                                        
3 When analysing CI in the context of disposable equivalent income (i.e., after taxes and public transfers), we 
use a net measure of CI by applying the individual average tax rate of the household to the originally collected 
gross measure of CI.   8 
tributed income of corporations, branch profits, reinvested earnings, etc.) and income on debt 
(interest), as well as income from rentals and leasing, and royalties. Investment income in-
cludes the components direct investment income, portfolio investment, and other investment 
income (OECD 2007), and also covers income imputed to households from net equity in life 
insurance reserves and in pension funds. A complication comes with the fact that rent from 
land (less expenses from rentals) is counted as investment income in the SNA, whereas rental 
housing or equipment is regarded as a production activity, and the respective income received 
is treated as part of mixed income (as recommended in the 1968 SNA). 
However, an investment in real estate rather than in the capital market yields the same 
level of return for the investor, thus this separation raises the question of whether the meas-
urement of capital income may be biased when considering rent from land only. This general 
problem also applies to the fictitious imputed rental value for owner-occupied housing (IR). 
Again, in the SNA-imputed rents are counted as a production activity, although all household 
members enjoy a fictitious income advantage from this investment. If the same household had 
invested in the capital market rather than in real estate, a direct income flow of capital income 
would have been observed as part of the household’s investment income.  
This—from a layman’s point of view artificial—differentiation hampers the analysis 
of capital income and its impact on overall inequality on the basis of population surveys. 
Obviously, the various subcomponents of investment income mentioned above are subject to 
specific measurement problems, especially for comparative research. A typical simplification 
is to lump together rent from land and other rental income. For example, in order to enhance 
comparability across various national datasets, the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) does not 
separate these income types, and includes income from renting as part of property income.  
Information about investment income in SOEP is collected at the household level for 
all household members. At first, SOEP asks separately for income from renting and leasing 
and for accompanying expenses. The final measure of total capital income is net of any ex-
penses which are related to rentals.4 SOEP does not differentiate between rentals from land 
and other rental income as the SNA does, but instead follows the procedure employed in LIS. 
                                                                        
4 Due to the specific way in which this information is collected in SOEP, there is a lower limit of zero; thus, 
possible losses from renting and leasing are not considered.   9 
Each household also has to specify whether any assets are held by any household 
member such as saving accounts, building savings contracts, life insurance policies, bonds, 
stocks or business assets. Each household also has to report the sum of all returns on the vari-
ous investments received over the previous year. If the exact amount is not known, the re-
spondents  can  give  a  rough  assessment  in  six  income  categories—these  values  are  trans-
formed into metric information for the analyses to follow.
5 Other property incomes such as 
royalties are not covered by the SOEP questionnaire.  
Another problem when trying to collect information about capital income in popula-
tion surveys is the lack of detailed information about imputed income from investments, e.g., 
in life insurance reserves. While investors regularly (typically on an annual basis) receive 
information about the accumulated stock on their investments, this information usually does 
not report the portion attributable to interest only. Thus respondents are not able to provide 
information about the return on that investment. This is one reason why population surveys 
typically underestimate investment income compared to the SNA. The measure of capital 
income in SOEP thus also does not cover income imputed to households from net equity in 
life insurance reserves and pension funds.  
According to Smeeding and Weinberg (2001), it is advisable to extend the concept of 
capital income to returns on private retirement pensions—as is done in the SNA. However, 
the concept “private retirement income” can consist of various forms of old-age provision. 
Private pensions could either be linked to an employment relationship, making them occupa-
tional pension plans, or they may be based on a contract between an individual and an insur-
ance company, making them personal pension plans (e.g., cash-value life insurance contracts). 
While occupational pensions can be interpreted as deferred labour compensation, and thus 
should not be counted as capital income, personal pensions can be seen as an alternative form 
of investment in insurance plans instead of in the capital market. However, some occupational 
pension schemes—at least in Germany—allow employees to make voluntary contributions to 
a pension account, thus also yielding returns on private investment. It is therefore difficult to 
separate the pure “private” portion from the deferred labour compensation. Although SOEP 
tries to collect detailed information about pension incomes, it still faces this separation prob-
                                                                        
5 Although SOEP collects information on irregular income inflows (windfall income), such as one-time trans-
fers, winnings, inheritances, gifts of money or goods, these are not considered in the measure of capital income 
employed below.  10 
lem. Thus, while any pension payments received are part of our standard income measure, we 
refrain from considering returns derived from private pension plans in the measure of capital 
income. 
When dealing with capital income, one might also think of capital gains. The Canberra 
Group (2001: 17) argues that “the theoretical argument for including capital gains in an ex-
tended measure of income is that this would be in line with the definition of income leaving a 
household as well off at the end of the accounting period as at the beginning. Capital gains or 
losses do have an effect on the economic behaviour of households and may affect their deci-
sions on consumption.” However, capital gains are not included in disposable income in the 
SNA, and the Canberra Group also does not recommended that they be considered (2001). 
While earnings on capital (such as dividends) are counted as income from an SNA perspec-
tive, capital gains (or losses) are not regarded as the result of a productive activity that affects 
GNP or total household income. Households almost certainly consider capital gains as a form 
of implicit saving, thus as a change in the value of an asset. This might be one reason why 
population surveys typically do not provide information about capital gains, as is the case 
with the SOEP.6 Above and beyond this data limitation we are not interested in changes in 
stocks but rather in changes in income flows, thus we refrain from considering capital gains in 
this paper, following the recommendation of the Canberra Group (2001: 28). 
2.2.2.2  Imputed Rent (IR) 
Imputed rent is a fictitious income advantage from owner-occupied housing. A house-
hold's decision to move into homeownership represents a trade-off in which the opportunity to 
invest in financial assets that would create real income flows through interest or dividends is 
foregone; thus, the welfare position of owner-occupiers would be biased as long as the ficti-
tious return from housing is not considered in an extended income concept. Based on such 
considerations, European Commission (EC) Regulation No. 1980/2003 provides an accurate 
definition of imputed rent to be used to harmonize income measurement in the context of the 
European Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC): “The imputed rent refers to 
the value that shall be imputed for all households that do not report paying full rent, either 
because they are owner-occupiers or they live in accommodation rented at a lower price than 
                                                                        
6 One exemption is the United States Bureau of the Census, which has published experimental measures of 
income that include, among other things, realized capital gains (see also Wolff and Zacharias 2009).  11 
the market price, or because the accommodation is provided rent-free. The imputed rent shall 
be estimated only for those dwellings (and any associated buildings such a garage) used as a 
main residence by the households. The value to impute shall be the equivalent market rent 
that would be paid for a similar dwelling as that occupied, less any rent actually paid (in the 
case where the accommodation is rented at a lower price than the market price), less any sub-
sidies received from the government or from a non-profit institution (if owner-occupied or the 
accommodation is rented at a lower price than the market price), less any minor repairs or 
refurbishment expenditure which the owner-occupier households make on the property of the 
type that would normally be carried out by landlords. The market rent is the rent due for the 
right to use an unfurnished dwelling on the private market, excluding charges for heating, 
water, electricity, etc.”
7 According to the European Commission regulation, potential benefi-
ciaries of IR include owner-occupiers, rent-free tenants and tenants with below-market rent, 
including those who live in public or social housing as well as those who have been granted a 
rent reduction by their respective landlord (e.g., relatives or employer).  
While this general definition of imputed rent can be seen as a blueprint for population 
surveys, one problem lies in determining the exact measure of an equivalent market rent. This 
is of particular importance for countries such as in the UK with a relatively low share of ten-
ants in the private housing market.8 Another problem is the accurate consideration of owner-
specific costs which need to be deducted to derive a measure of net imputed rent. 
The SOEP measure of imputed rent employed in the following has been defined along 
the lines of the EC regulation using the Opportunity Cost Approach.9 This procedure also 
includes advantages of living in subsidized rented accommodation or living rent-free (the 
latter group may indeed include former owner-occupiers (often outright owners), who hand 
over the deeds to their property to their children in exchange for a usufructuary right to re-
main in their current dwelling).   
                                                                        
7 See European Commission (EC) Regulation No. 1980/2003 of 21 October 2003 implementing Regulation 
(EC) No 1177/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning Community statistics on income 
and living conditions (EU-SILC) as regards definitions and updated definitions.  
8 For a detailed discussion about measurement problems when deriving a fictitious income advantage from 
imputed rents see the various country reports which were published in the context of the EU funded project 
Accurate  Income  Measurement  for  the  Assessment  of  Public  Policies  (AIM-AP) 
(http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/euromod/aim-ap-project).   12 
The opportunity cost approach applied in the SOEP is based on a regression of gross 
rent per square meter (not including heating costs) actually paid by main tenants in the private 
market. Independent variables include the year of construction, condition of dwelling, size of 
dwelling, length of occupancy, community size, and disposable income. Applying these re-
gression coefficients to the population of otherwise comparable owner-occupiers and indi-
viduals living in households with reduced rent yields a gross measure of imputed rents. After 
deducting all owner-related costs such as operating, maintenance, and interest payments on 
mortgages, as well as property taxes, one arrives at a net value of IR that can be interpreted as 
the income advantage of owner-occupied housing. For rent-free households and persons liv-
ing in households with below-market rent, no further deductions have to be made. The most 
important owner-specific costs are interest payments on mortgages.10 Assuming a standard 
(German) mortgage with regular payments over a period of 30 years, we find an increasing 
income advantage for owners over the entire period. At the beginning of the payment period, 
interest payments clearly exceed the mortgage payments. As times goes by, the share of the 
mortgage that is paid off increases, leaving  an  increasing income  advantage from owner-
occupied housing (for more details on the imputation of IR in SOEP, as well as for sensitivity 
analyses showing the variation in the distributional impact by the choice of the method used 
to derive IR, see Frick et al. 2007).  
Imputed rents are approximated both in the SNA as well as in population surveys. 
While IR in the SNA is counted as a production activity, thus not as investment income, 
population surveys typically provide IR as a separate piece of fictitious income information. 
Thus a user can decide whether IR should be counted as investment income or not. In the 
following, we describe the impact of the monetary component of investment income (CI) 
separately from the non-monetary, fictitious income advantage (IR) on the overall inequality.  
                                                                        
9 Other methods to derive IR, such as the market-value approach and the self-assessment approach, as well as 
differences in the final outcome measure of IR arising from the choice of the method used to derive IR, are 
described in detail in Frick and Grabka (2003) and Frick et al (2009).  
10 Interest payments on mortgages are not tax-deductible in Germany. This is different from most of other 
European countries, where homeownership is explicitly promoted through various tax-favoured treatments.  13 
2.3  Methodology 
Following standard procedures in inequality research and in order to check the robust-
ness and sensitivity of our findings, we employ various indicators of inequality: the Gini coef-
ficient which is more sensitive to changes in the middle of the income distribution, as well as 
the half-squared coefficient of variation (HSCV) which belongs to the family of generalised 
entropy measures and is also referred to the I2 measure.  























This index is more sensitive to changes at the top end of the income hierarchy. Com-
paring time series on inequality results obtained from such measures when applied to income 
with and without CI and IR will help to identify where in the income distribution these two 
components matter most.  
In order to analyze which population subgroups are most affected by the consideration 
of investment income in the final (full) outcome measure of disposable income, we make use 
of the decomposition by subgroups as described in Shorrocks (1984), based on the MLD. The 
MLD also belongs to the family of generalised entropy measures and is sensitive to changes 
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3  Empirical results  
Above and beyond describing what has been going on with respect to different types 
of investment income in Germany since the mid-1980s, we are especially interested to see 
which subgroups of the population might be affected most by these types of income.11 The 
German pay-as-you-go (PAYG) public pension system is clearly under pressure to cut back, 
mostly due to increasing longevity and decreasing fertility rates, while at the same time, a 
range of newly established publicly co-funded financial instruments (e.g., Riester-Rente) are 
driving increasing numbers of people to invest in private old-age provision. Thus, age is a 
crucial structural variable in the following analyses. Among other issues, we will address the 
question of whether inequality decomposition by age (within/between-group inequality) has 
also changed over time due to the inclusion of CI and IR. At least for IR, this is to be expected 
from the literature (e.g., Yates 1994). However, the picture for CI may be less clear. On the 
one hand, the elderly are typically more risk-averse and “conservative” in their investment 
behaviour, which should yield lower interest. On the other hand, due to their longer periods of 
accumulation, their financial holdings (wealth stock) should be higher, thus also improving 
their chances for risk diversification.  
The following section contains time-consistent estimates for Germany based on annual 
income data from the SOEP. The time series shown in the following analyses refer to the year 
of the observation; thus, the income refers to the previous calendar year. That is, the most 
recent measure used here is from 2007 and gives the annual income as of 2006. Due to the 
sweeping changes in the income distribution in the early years after the end of the GDR, an-
nual incomes for the East German subsample of the SOEP can only be provided starting with 
income year 1991. Thus all time series on income, inequality and poverty give results based 
on West Germany only until 1991, and results for unified Germany thereafter.12  
                                                                        
11  Finally, it should be noted that all of the following analyses refer to the population in private households 
only, i.e., we exclude individuals living in institutions such as nursing homes.  
12  All empirical analyses have been conducted using Stata, Version 9.2. For the analyses of inequality, we drew 
heavily on add-ons for measurement and decomposition of inequality and poverty by subgroup as provided by 
Philippe van Kerm (CEPS/Instead) and, Stephen P. Jenkins (Univ of Essex).  15 
3.1  Incidence and Relevance of IR and CI 
The “incidence” of a given income component is simply measured by the share of in-
dividuals receiving a given income component (here IR and CI), whereas the “relevance” of 
IR and CI is defined as the percent of each in baseline income.  Figure 2 reveals that by and 
large, there is a rather stable share of about 40 % of the population receiving IR. There is an 
expected  dip  after  German  unification  caused  by  the  considerably  lower  share  of  owner-
occupiers in the new federal states of East Germany. Similarly the share of individuals receiv-
ing some type of capital income ranges between 80 and nearly 90 % over the entire period, 
with a slight reduction in the years since 2000.  
Obviously, these figures do not reveal how much of a given income source a person 
actually receives. Thus, Figure 3 gives the relevance of both income sources as a share of our 
augmented equivalent annual post-government income. Separating IR and CI from the base-
line income reveals that these two components doubled from the mid-1980s to 2007. This is 
true in absolute as well as in relative terms. For example, IR as a share of baseline disposable 
income went from 2.9% in 1985 to more than 5% in 2007; similarly, the relevance of CI in-
creased from 3.4% to 5.7%. Finally, it should be noted that although the incidence of imputed 
rent is lower than that of capital income, it constitutes a larger fraction of income among the 
households who receive IR, since the percentage of total income is similar for capital income 
and imputed rent.  
Analyzing  the  incidence  of  the  two  components  across  baseline  income  quintiles 
shows very little variation in the distribution of beneficiaries from IR over the income hierar-
chy (see Table 1 below), while the beneficiaries of CI are clearly more concentrated at the top 
of the distribution. This pattern is even more pronounced when looking at the relevance, thus 
the share of income coming from the respective components. When moving up the income 
ladder, the amount of equivalent income derived from CI is less than 500 euros among house-
holds in the first quintile in 2007, while this value is five times higher among households in 
the top quintile.  
The rise in magnitude of both income components is in line with macro-statistics re-
vealing a clear reduction in the share of GDP coming from labour income (this share peaked 
in 1993 at almost 68% and sunk to 61% in 2007, see Frick & Grabka 2008).   16 
Figure 2: Incidence of Capital Income and Imputed Rent in Germany, 1985 to 2007 
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Note: Population: individuals in private households. Up to 1991 West Germany only.  
Source: SOEP 1985-2007 
 
Figure 3: Relevance of Capital Income and Imputed Rent in Germany, 1985 to 2007 
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Notes: Population: individuals in private households. Up to 1991 West Germany only.  
Source: SOEP 1985-2007  17 
3.2  Income inequality 
Turning to the effects of IR and CI on disposable income inequality, Figure 4 com-
pares  inequality  indices  (Gini  and  HSCV)  for  baseline  income  with  those  for  augmented 
“full” income measures including IR, CI, and both at the same time.  
We observe a consistent inequality-reducing effect arising from the consideration of 
IR which is in line with the literature (see e.g. Yates 1994 for the case of Australia, Frick & 
Grabka 2003 for the US, UK as well as Germany and Frick et al. 2009 for various EU coun-
tries), although one should keep in mind that our baseline income measure does not include 
capital income as typically is the case! The incorporation of IR into the baseline equivalent 
disposable income reduces income inequality according to the Gini coefficient by about 1-2% 
which appears related to the fact that the beneficiaries from IR are more equally distributed 
across the income distribution.13 At the same time, the top-sensitive HSCV shows a consid-
erably larger inequality reduction effect up to 5%, which is of the same magnitude when look-
ing at the bottom-sensitive MLD. These somewhat stronger effects at the tails of the income 
distribution are the result of two aspects: homeowners in general tend to be higher up in the 
income hierarchy, however, due to the nature of the typical mortgage repayment schemes, the 
net IR measure—which we apply here—is supposedly more concentrated among the elderly, 
who are typically associated with somewhat lower baseline incomes.  
A very different finding arises for CI, where disposable income inequality is clearly 
rising due to the inclusion of this income component which disproportionately goes to high 
earners. First, as expected, this increase is much stronger when looking at the top-sensitive 
HSCV than in case of the Gini. The respective relative changes are 3% to 6% for the Gini 
coefficient, while the relative change using the HSCV is about 10 times higher. Second, the 
change resulting from the incorporation of CI—although volatile—does increase over time. 
While the HSCV increased due to the inclusion of CI by about 10% to 20% in the eighties and 
nineties, this relative change has more than doubled in recent years. Obviously, omitting CI 
and IR from an extended income measure would severely bias long time series on income 
inequality in Germany.  
                                                                        
13 However, this inequality reducing effect arising from the inclusion of IR may vary considerably with the 
share of individuals living in owner-occupied housing. According to Frick et al. (2009) the Gini coefficient drops 
by more than 5% when including IR in cases of Greece and Italy, where ownership rates are above 70%.   18 
Figure 4: The Impact of Capital Income and Imputed Rent on Income Inequality in Germany, 
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Notes: Population: individuals in private households. Up to 1991 West Germany only.  
Source: SOEP 1985-2007  19 
Summing up, income inequality in Germany has increased significantly from the mid-
1980s to the most recent years. Using a comprehensive disposable income measure (including 
IR and CI), the Gini moves up from around .26 to more than .31. This increase in inequality 
has been paralleled by shrinking incomes among the middle class (see Grabka & Frick 2008).  
Irrespective of an overall inequality reduction effect arising from imputed rent, there was a 
massive pro-rich growth of capital income during the financial boom period of the late 1990s 
to 2007, which overall has yielded an increasing income concentration. This is confirmed by 
the even stronger increase in the top-sensitive HSCV measure which moves from .195 in 
1985 to more than .300 in 2007. 
3.3  Relative Poverty 
Throughout the period under investigation, and in line with the above-mentioned de-
velopment of inequality, the relative poverty risk rate in Germany reached record levels in 
2006 (about 18%), followed by a minor reduction in 2007, which was mainly due to improved 
labour market conditions and reduced unemployment in the economic upswing till 2008 (see 
Frick & Grabka 2008). In order to adequately show the effect on poverty of incorporating IR 
and CI into the income measure, we need to dynamically adjust the poverty threshold when 
including each of the aforementioned income components (see Figure 5).  
With respect to the inclusion of IR, our results are strongly supportive of the inequality-
dampening effect of imputed rent: the poverty reduction effect as measured by the change in 
the poverty risk rate (i.e., FGT0 in the top panel of Figure 5) is clearly visible during the 
eighties and nineties and levels off over the first decade of the new century. However, when 
giving more weight to inequality among the poor by applying the FGT2 index (a =2) in the 
lower panel in Figure 5, the reduction effect arising from IR becomes clearly more pro-
nounced (around 20%).  
Including CI in the income measure does not show a similarly clear-cut picture with respect to 
the poverty head count ratio (FGT0), however, there is a more pronounced poverty-reduction 
effect increasing in a. The overall effect arising from including both, IR and CI, is a clear 
poverty reduction. However, it should be noted that these reduction effects appear to dwindle 
over time: for example, up to the end of the last century, the poverty-reduction effect for 
FGT2 was in the range of 20%, whereas this effect was only 10% in more recent years.   20 
Figure 5: The Impact of Capital Income and Imputed Rent on the Risk of Relative Poverty in 
Germany, 1985 to 2007 
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Notes: Population: individuals in private households. Up to 1991 West Germany only.  
Relative Poverty Line at 60% of median equivalent income (PL is dynamically adjusted when including IR and 
CI, respectively) 
Source: SOEP 1985-2007    21 
3.4  Subgroup analyses 
3.4.1  Investment income by income quintile and age groups 
Having analysed these time trends on the basis of the entire population in private 
households, we now turn to the question of where in the income distribution these effects 
matter most, as well as which socio-economic characteristics are likely to be affected most by 
the inclusion of IR and CI. Thus, we compare the incidence and relevance of IR and CI across 
baseline disposable income quintiles (Table 1) as well as across age groups (Table 2).  Due to 
the above-mentioned changes over time, we run these analyses separately for 1997 and 2007. 
While the share of the population with IR is modified only slightly across baseline in-
come quintiles, there is a pronounced positive relationship between CI and baseline income 
(see top panel in Table 1). For both income components, we see that these relationships be-
come stronger from 1997 to 2007.  
Adding IR and CI to baseline income (second panel in Table 1) and analysing the rela-
tive change shows for 1997, each of the two components adds about 5% to baseline income, 
although this increase is much stronger among the poorest quintile (plus 20% once we add IR 
and CI), whereas the richest quintile increases its baseline income only by less than 10%. 
However, for the latter, this is due to the higher baseline income and masks the fact that the 
absolute average amount of IR and CI added in each quintile is in principle positively corre-
lated with baseline income. The only exception appears to be the very lowest income group: 
this is most likely a reflection of the higher probability of poor people enjoying the fictitious 
income advantage of subsidized social housing, which is included in our measure of IR. When 
looking at the absolute figures for CI and IR, one observes that in 1997, the highest income 
quintile had 1.7 times more investment income than the poorest quintile, and that by 2007 this 
ratio had more than doubled, showing the former to have 3.5 times more investment income 
than the latter (€4,208 vs. €1,183).   22 
Table 1: The Impact of Imputed Rent and Capital Income by Baseline Income Quintile 
   1997  2007 
   Population Share (%) holding ...  
Quintile  IR  CI  IR  CI 
1 (bottom)  38  69  35  60 
2  37  86  38  76 
3  37  91  42  86 
4  42  95  44  91 
5 (top)  42  95  49  96 
All  39  87  41  82 
                 
   Equivalent Income (Euro)  
Quintile  Baseline    IR  CI  IR & CI  Baseline    IR  CI   IR & CI 
1 (bottom)  7140  724  726  1450  6661  690  494  1183 
2  11638  625  386  1012  11468  778  581  1359 
3  14416  681  461  1142  14871  879  627  1506 
4  17937  815  834  1650  19466  1055  1012  2067 
5 (top)  27467  995  1524  2519  31826  1548  2659  4208 
All  15714  768  786  1554  16856  990  1075  2064 
                 
   Income from IR & CI as a % of Baseline Income 





incl. IR & 
CI 





incl. IR & 
CI 
1 (bottom)   /   10.1  10.2  20.3   /   10.4  7.4  17.8 
2   /   5.4  3.3  8.7   /   6.8  5.1  11.9 
3   /   4.7  3.2  7.9   /   5.9  4.2  10.1 
4   /   4.5  4.7  9.2   /   5.4  5.2  10.6 
5 (top)   /   3.6  5.5  9.2   /   4.9  8.4  13.2 
All   /   4.9  5.0  9.9   /   5.9  6.4  12.2 
                 
   Income Share (%) 





incl. IR & 
CI 





incl. IR & 
CI 
1 (bottom)  9.1  9.3  9.0  9.1  7.9  8.1  7.7  7.8 
2  14.8  14.8  14.5  14.4  13.6  13.6  13.1  13.1 
3  18.4  18.4  18.0  18.0  17.7  17.7  17.1  17.2 
4  22.9  22.8  22.6  22.7  23.1  23.0  22.7  22.6 
5 (top)  34.9  34.7  35.9  35.8  37.8  37.6  39.4  39.3 
All  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Notes: Population: individuals in private households. Income in 2000 prices. Up to 1991 West Germany only.  
Source: SOEP 1997 and 2007 
The lowest panel in Table 1 reports the share of overall income held per income quin-
tile for each of the four income specifications: While in 1997 the poorest fifth of the popula-
tion had only 9.1% of baseline income, the richest possessed over 34.9%. Adding IR to base-
line income made the distribution slightly less unequal, whereas adding CI again increased the 
inequality  somewhat.  Considering  both  components  of  property  income  at  the  same  time 
yielded more or less the same picture. Apparently, for all indicators shown in this table, there 
is a consistent change from 1997 to 2007 towards rising inequality. This can be exemplified  23 
by the even more pronounced increase in CI among the highest income groups, the reduced 
(increased) share of property income among the poorest (richest), and finally by the fact that 
in 2007, 39.3% of full disposable income was in the hands of the top 20%, as compared to 
only 37.8% of baseline income.  
Table 2 reports similar information for age groups rather than for income quintiles. 
There is the expected positive relationship between the probability of enjoying IR and age—
with the exception of the youngest age group: their somewhat higher share of IR recipients 
does not so much reflect early homeownership as it does young adults still living with their 
parents. On the other hand, we do not find a strong correlation between age and the probabil-
ity of getting returns on CI (top panel of Table 2).  
 
Table 2: The Impact of Imputed Rent and Capital Income by Age Group 
   1997  2007 
   Population Share (%) holding ...  
Age group  IR  CI  IR  CI 
less than 25  35  86  34  79 
25-<40  28  88  25  82 
40-<50  38  88  36  83 
50-<65  49  89  54  82 
65 and more  53  87  61  83 
All  39  87  41  82 
                 
   Equivalent Income (Euro)  
Age group  Baseline   IR  CI  IR & CI  Baseline   IR  CI   IR & CI 
less than 25  14320  529  583  1112  14865  619  675  1293 
25-<40  16130  468  465  933  16803  527  583  1109 
40-<50  17642  675  853  1528  18445  668  1036  1704 
50-<65  17130  1061  1222  2283  19881  1428  1442  2871 
65 and more  14027  1324  999  2323  15254  1810  1788  3598 
All  15714  768  786  1554  16856  990  1075  2064 
                 
   Income from IR & CI as a % of Baseline Income 





incl. IR & 
CI 





incl. IR & 
CI 
less than 25   /   3.7  4.1  7.8   /   4.2  4.5  8.7 
25-<40   /   2.9  2.9  5.8   /   3.1  3.5  6.6 
40-<50   /   3.8  4.8  8.7   /   3.6  5.6  9.2 
50-<65   /   6.2  7.1  13.3   /   7.2  7.3  14.4 
65 and more   /   9.4  7.1  16.6   /   11.9  11.7  23.6 
All   /   4.9  5.0  9.9   /   5.9  6.4  12.2 
Notes: Population: individuals in private households. Income in 2000 prices. Until 1991 West Germany, only.  
Source: SOEP 1997 and 2007 
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Nevertheless, for those with IR from owner-occupied housing, we see the well-known 
strong increase in that type of income across age groups, which simply reflects the degree to 
which mortgages are paid off and equity is increased. For example, in 1997, 25-40-years-olds 
had €468 in IR on average, while those aged 65 and over had about three times this amount 
(€1,324). In line with a standard age profile of wealth, the absolute amount of CI peaked 
among the 50-65-year-olds (1997: €1,222) and diminished slightly in the oldest cohort (€999) 
due to dissaving and transfers to younger generations, among other things.  However, consid-
ering both types of income together, the oldest enjoy the highest average amount of (all types 
of) investment income. Comparing again the situation in 2007 with the situation ten years 
earlier, it appears that the oldest profited most from the aforementioned increase in inequality: 
while considering IR and CI pushed baseline incomes of those aged 65 and over up 17% in 
1997, their incomes rose further to almost 24% in 2007, compared to a much lower impact 
among the middle age groups.  
3.4.2  Inequality decomposition by subgroup 
The extent to which these differences across subgroups impact on income inequality 
can be assessed by means of inequality decomposition analysis. Based on the mean log devia-
tion (MLD), which exhibits the necessary criteria of being an additively decomposable ine-
quality measure, Table 3 gives the respective results for decomposition by household/family 
type, socio-economic status of the household head as well as by individual age. The latter 
appears to be an important structural variable in light of our hypothesis on the increasing 
relevance of returns on private investment (i.e., CI and IR) as an alternative income source in 
old age. As such, in order to provide evidence of possible changes over time, we repeat this 
analysis for the years 1997 and 2007.  
The inclusion of IR and CI increases the baseline income measure by about 10% in 
1997 and by more than 12% in 2007. This increase however is not evenly spread, but clearly 
over proportional among the elderly (especially due to IR), for individuals living in house-
holds headed by pensioners (due to IR) and by self-employed (mostly due to CI). Again, 
young adults who are still living at home profit from their parents’ IR and CI (due to the stan-
dard assumption of pooling and sharing of resources across all household members). In line 
with the results mentioned in earlier sections, all those effects are much stronger in 2007.   25 
With respect to inequality the change induced by investment income in the overall 
MLD is 15.6% in 1997 and 47.4% in 2007. While this huge change may be an indication for 
the volatility of CI, it is perfectly in line with the general increase in inequality in Germany 
over this period which is strongly related to massive unemployment (Frick and Grabka 2008).  
One of the advantages of inequality decomposition by subgroup is the opportunity to evaluate 
changes of within- and between-group inequality, here caused by the incorporation of both 
sources of investment income. In general, we find that within-group inequality increases sig-
nificantly when considering returns on private investments in absolute as well as in relative 
terms. On the other hand, the contribution of between-group inequality declines when consid-
ering investment income – and it drops even in absolute terms when decomposing by house-
hold / family type. This is mostly driven by the fact that households with elderly heads (aged 
60 and over), who represent about one-quarter of the population, exhibit a rather low baseline 
inequality. In 2007, the MLD for this group was 0.151 compared to 0.204 in the overall popu-
lation; however, for the full income measure, the MLD was 0.314 as compared to 0.301—this 
over-proportional change causes the share of aggregate inequality that can be attributed to this 
group to increase from 18% in the baseline model to 26% in the full model. In contrast, in 
1997 this group did not change its contribution to overall inequality when comparing baseline 
and full income. Similarly, persons in households headed by a self-employed person who 
make up less than 8% of the population in both years, contributed only 7% to aggregate ine-
quality in 1997, but to more than 13% of aggregate inequality in 2007. In other words, for all 
subgroups where we observe an above-average incidence of investment income, the within-
group inequality also shows an above-average increase over time, outweighing changes in 
inequality across groups.  
4  Conclusions 
There have been a number of papers seeking to explain the general trend of increased 
income inequality in the majority of the OECD countries. While many of these papers discuss 
(structural) changes in the labour market and earnings as well as in the population as the driv-
ing forces behind income inequality, this paper focuses on the scope and structure of invest-
ment income. This type of income not only consists of monetary capital income (such as in-
terest and dividends), but should also include fictitious returns from investments in real estate 
(imputed rents). We demonstrate the separate impacts of these two types of investment in- 26 
come, but also provide evidence underscoring the need to consider their joint impact Our 
definition of IR follows a regulation by the European Commission, which is currently being 
used to harmonize the income measurement for the European Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) in Europe.  
Using representative microdata from the German SOEP, the incorporation of capital 
income and imputed rent (for owner-occupied housing as well as for rent-free and otherwise 
subsidized tenants) into the measure of investment income clearly indicates the increasing 
relevance of these income sources for economic inequality in Germany over the last two dec-
ades. While the two components can be commonly defined as returns on alternative private 
investments  (CI  =  return  on  financial  investments,  IR  =  return  on  investments  in  owner-
occupied housing), they do not necessarily coincide with respect to their impact on income 
inequality and poverty. We find that, in line with the literature, whereas IR tends to exert a 
dampening effect on inequality and relative poverty, CI tends to accentuate inequality. In 
recent years, as the German public pension scheme has proven itself ever less capable of 
maintaining people’s living standards into retirement, we find these effects to be of increasing 
magnitude.  
Both incomes, IR and CI, are strongly related to age. In case of net IR—the most 
prevalent means of old-age provision outside the public pension system—this effect simply 
results from the increasing share of outright ownership among the elderly. For CI, there is a 
savings-related accumulation of capital in higher age groups, supported by the increased prob-
ability of inheritances around the age of 50 to 60. This process again yields higher financial 
returns, such as interest and dividends—however, one should also consider that the invest-
ment behaviour of the elderly most likely is more risk-averse due to the smaller chances for 
recuperating from large financial losses by means of alternative incomes.  
Another important issue from a social policy standpoint is that income decomposition 
by subgroup confirms the established fact for most western countries that private investment 
in owner-occupied housing is a very effective means of reducing the risk of old-age poverty 
as well as inequality (see Zaidi et al. 2006).  Thus any age-related income analysis will be 
biased if the fictitious income advantage arising from owner-occupied housing was not con-
sidered. This argument will be of much more relevance when performing cross-country com-
parisons where different structures of housing tenure will affect the magnitude of this income 
component over the whole income distribution.  27 
Summing up, the analyses presented here make a clear case for the joint consideration 
of all components of private investment income (this should also systematically include in-
come from private pensions, which are currently included in our baseline income measure) for 
the purpose of welfare analysis, be they of a monetary or non-monetary nature. This appears 
to be relevant in at least three dimensions of comparative research: (1) across time; (2) across 
space and welfare systems, thus also accounting for differences in the incentive structure to 
choose from different sorts of private investments (e.g., self-employed vs. dependent em-
ployed employees); and (3) across the individual life course, thus analyzing the impact of 
investment income on intrapersonal mobility patterns. Obviously, the panel nature of the data 
used in this paper, will help to address the latter point in future research. Against the back-
ground of ageing societies and a shift from the PAYG old-age pension systems to increased 
private coverage—in non-liberal welfare regimes in particular—returns on investment income 
are likely to yield higher levels of income inequality in the near future.  
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Table 3: The Inequality Decomposition by Subgroup 
   1997  2007 
Mean Log  
Deviation (MLD) 
% contribution to 
aggregate inequality 
Mean Log  
Deviation (MLD) 










to IR & 
CI (%) 
Baseline  Including 





IR & CI 
(%) 
Baseline  Including 








to IR & 
CI (%) 
Baseline  Including 




due to IR 
& CI 
(%) 
Baseline  Including 
IR & CI 
Household / Family type                             
Single <=60  9.1  12  0.1789  0.2671  49.3  12.5  16.2  10.7  9  0.2086  0.3826  83.4  10.9  13.6 
Couple no kids <=60  13.6  8  0.1060  0.1179  11.2  11.1  10.7  14.1  10  0.2549  0.3335  30.8  17.6  15.6 
HH with children up to 17   38.7  7  0.1332  0.1482  11.2  39.7  38.2  36.9  8  0.1865  0.2339  25.4  33.7  28.7 
HH with adult children  15.4  9  0.1012  0.1113  10.0  12.0  11.4  13.8  11  0.1766  0.2440  38.2  11.9  11.2 
HH head aged >60   23.2  15  0.1088  0.1259  15.7  19.5  19.5  24.5  23  0.1513  0.3135  107.2  18.2  25.5 
% Within-groups inequality  ./.  ./.  0.1231  0.1440  17.0  94.9  96.0  ./.  ./.  0.1978  0.2950  49.2  96.9  98.0 
% Between groups inequality  ./.  ./.  0.0067  0.0060  -9.8  5.1  4.0  ./.  ./.  0.0064  0.0059  -7.2  3.1  2.0 
Socioeconomic group of HH 
head 
                           
Blue collar worker  19.8  5  0.0567  0.0597  5.4  8.7  7.9  16.9  6  0.0651  0.0704  8.1  5.4  3.9 
White collar worker  33.8  8  0.1090  0.1169  7.3  28.4  26.3  35.2  8  0.1234  0.1426  15.6  21.3  16.7 
Self-employed  7.1  15  0.1393  0.1542  10.7  7.6  7.3  7.9  18  0.3315  0.5115  54.3  12.8  13.4 
Unemployed  7.6  7  0.1080  0.1087  0.6  6.3  5.5  7.6  5  0.1756  0.1901  8.3  6.6  4.8 
Pensioner  23.7  17  0.1071  0.1645  53.5  19.6  26.0  23.5  22  0.1184  0.2199  85.8  13.6  17.2 
Other  8.0  9  0.1476  0.1549  4.9  9.0  8.2  8.8  15  0.2928  0.7147  144.1  12.7  21.0 
% Within-groups inequality  ./.  ./.  0.1098  0.1295  17.9  84.6  86.3  ./.  ./.  0.1720  0.2669  55.2  84.3  88.7 
% Between groups inequality  ./.  ./.  0.0200  0.0205  2.9  15.4  13.7  ./.  ./.  0.0321  0.0340  5.9  15.7  11.3 
Age of HH member                             
Below 25  26.9  8  0.1352  0.1496  10.7  28.0  26.8  25.7  9  0.1919  0.2441  27.2  24.2  20.8 
25-<40  23.4  6  0.1059  0.1092  3.0  19.1  17.0  19.8  7  0.1509  0.1722  14.2  14.6  11.3 
40-<50  13.9  9  0.1169  0.1401  19.8  12.5  13.0  16.5  9  0.1696  0.2958  74.4  13.7  16.2 
50-<65  19.8  13  0.1422  0.1778  25.1  21.7  23.5  18.8  14  0.2765  0.3757  35.9  25.5  23.5 
65 and more  16.0  17  0.1225  0.1418  15.8  15.1  15.1  19.2  24  0.1524  0.3149  106.6  14.3  20.1 
% Within-groups inequality  ./.  ./.  0.1259  0.1459  15.9  97.0  97.2  ./.  ./.  0.1978  0.2938  48.6  96.9  97.6 
% Between groups inequality  ./.  ./.  0.0039  0.0041  5.6  3.0  2.8  ./.  ./.  0.0064  0.0072  12.3  3.1  2.4 
ALL  100.0  10  0.1298  0.1501  15.6  100.0  100.0  100.0  12  0.2042  0.3010  47.4  100.0  100.0 
Notes: Population: individuals in private households. Up to 1991 West Germany only.  
Source: SOEP 1997 and 2007 